Fraud, Fools, and Phishing: Mail Fraud and the Person of Ordinary Prudence in the Internet Age by Lunsford, Lauren D.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 99 | Issue 2 Article 5
2010
Fraud, Fools, and Phishing: Mail Fraud and the
Person of Ordinary Prudence in the Internet Age
Lauren D. Lunsford
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Communications Law Commons, and the Internet Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lunsford, Lauren D. (2010) "Fraud, Fools, and Phishing: Mail Fraud and the Person of Ordinary Prudence in the Internet Age,"
Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 99 : Iss. 2 , Article 5.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol99/iss2/5
NOTES
Fraud, Fools, and Phishing: Mail Fraud and the Person
of Ordinary Prudence in the Internet Age
Lauren D. LunsforP
"[Wihen the son of the deposed king of Nigeria emails you directly, asking
for help, you help! His father ran the freaking country! Ok?"2
INTRODUCTION
T HE mail and wire fraud statutes' are far-reaching in the modern 
era of
feder l courts and are very commonly used within the federal system.4
They are the vehicle of choice for the prosecution of "a large number and
variety of federal white collar" crimes.' A former federal prosecutor once
referred to the mail and wire fraud statutes as "our Stradivarius, our Colt 45,
our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart--our true love. We always come home
to the virtues of the mail fraud statute, with its simplicity, adaptability,
and comfortable familiarity."6 The elements of mail and wire fraud' are
as simple as they are commonly used. Mail and wire fraud are committed
when someone: (1) devises or attempts to devise a scheme intended to
defraud in order to obtain money or property; (2) the scheme includes a
I Bachelor of Arts, University of Kentucky, Sociology; Juris Doctor expected 2011,
University of Kentucky College of Law. The author wishes to thank Professor Sarah N.
Welling whose invaluable insights and contributions inspired and catalyzed this Note from
the beginning to the end of the process.
2 THE OFFICE QUOTES, http://www.theofficequotes.com/season-2/michaels-birthday
(last visited Aug. 20, 2010).
3 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2oo6).
4 J. KELLY STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME § 4.01 (2d ed. zoo6).
5 Id.
6 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Ma il Fraud Statute (pt. I),
18 Duo. L. REV. 771, 771 (I98o)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
7 The mail and wire fraud statutes contained in 18 U.S.C. §1341 and § 1343 are inter-
changeable for all logical and theoretical purposes throughout this Note. Their respective ju-
risdictional bases are, however, different. Mail fraud (18 U.S.C. §1341) jurisdiction is obtained
through the Postal Power. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 7; United States v. Elliott, 89 E3d 136o,
1363-64 (8th Cir. 1996). Wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343) jurisdiction is based on the Commerce
Clause. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (stating that any scheme must be "trans-
mitted ... in interstate or foreign commerce").
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material misrepresentation or omission; and (3) the mail or wires are used
in furtherance of the fraud.'
With those elements in mind, imagine that someone located at a
computer in Nigeria, using the name Multah Williams, creates a mass email
that reads as follows:
How are you my dear friend? I hope you will be an honesty and sincere
person to handle this viable project. I am Multah Williams, The first son of
General Roland Williams (Late). Member of the formal RUF Leaders from
Sierra Leone. Presently, I am residing in "Gambia", I have about 125kg
of Gold Dust of good quality ready for export to any reliable person, as I
thought it is wise now to look for any prospective buyer or some one who
will be willing to assist me move the gold to the market.
The Gold is here in "Gambia" in a security house for safe keeping, and
it will be very good for any interested buyer to come over here in Gambia
where the gold is kept for the verification of the gold and for immediate
arrangement for shipment in to the market.
All the Export Documents is available; please, reply my mail immediately
if you are interested so that we can proceed with the shipment immediately,
and please if you are not interested, please, kindly forget it. I really believe
in you and I am sure, you will not let me down.
Thank you very much for your audience and corporation.
Regards,
Multah Williams.9
If someone receives this email, and through gullibility, inattention, or
otherwise, exchanges information and eventually money or property with
Multah Williams, has Williams committed mail or wire fraud? The answer
to this question of federal criminal law depends upon which federal circuit
court tries the case.
The explanation for this variation among federal circuits lies in the
interpretation of the materiality element of the mail and wire fraud statutes
after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Neder v. United States.'0 Since this
landmark Supreme Court decision, materiality has been a necessary element
of the mail and wire fraud statutes." Federal courts of appeals, however,
have interpreted the materiality requirement differently, creating a split in
the circuits as to what federal prosecutors have to prove in order to convict
a defendant of mail fraud." The two interpretations of materiality that have
8 Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 29o8 n.i (2010) ("The mail- and wire-fraud
statutes criminalize the use of the mails or wires in furtherance of 'any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, repre-
sentations, or promises."' (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343)).
9 E-mail from Multah Williams to Sarah N. Welling, Professor of Law, University of
Kentucky College of Law (Sept. 1, 2009, 13:41 EST) (on file with author).
io Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999).
II Id. at 25.
12 Compare PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONs DRAFTING COMM., PATTERN CRIMINAL
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developed are nicknamed the objective and subjective approaches. The
objective approach requires the fraud to be capable of influencing a person
of "ordinary prudence."" The subjective approach requires the fraud to
have a tendency to influence the decision of the decisionmaker to whom a
communication is addressed in order to be material.14
The difference is clear and significant. As one author explained,
"[alt stake in this conflict are the breadth of two of the most wide-
reaching federal criminal laws and the degree of protection afforded some
of the less prudent members of our society."" The objective "person of
ordinary prudence" standard creates a higher threshold of proof for federal
prosecutors than the more subjective standard requiring that the fraud only
have a tendency to influence the person to whom it was addressed.'" The
plain implication of this circuit split is that in circuits utilizing the person of
ordinary prudence standard, those who create fraudulent schemes appear
to be insulated from prosecution and liability for their crime if their victim
is not considered a "person of ordinary prudence."" Those who are not
provided with the protection of the mail fraud law are likely to be those
most disadvantaged in society, such as the mentally ill, feeble-minded, or
simply the most gullible or inattentive; ironically, these individuals need
the protection of the laws the most.s
This Note analyzes the rMail and wire fraud statutes. Part I, Fraud,
begins with a look at the inception of the statutes and their interpretation
by the United States Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals. Part
II, Fools, discusses the evolution and confusion prevalent in the courts of
appeals regarding the materiality component of the statutes. Finally, Part
III, Phishing, applies the various standards of materiality that have evolved
in the courts of appeals to the modern fraud problems that inundate our
everyday lives, specifically fraud attempts conducted through the medium
JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT § 4.12 (1997) ("A'mate-
rial' fact or matter is one that has a natural tendency to influence or be capable of influenc-
ing the decisionmaker to whom it was addressed."), with Comm. ON PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY
INsTRUCTIONS, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: SIXTH CIRCUIT § IO.OI(2)(D) (2009)
[hereinafter SixTH CIRCUIT, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS] ("A misrepresentation or
concealment is 'material' if it has a natural tendency to influence or is capable of influencing
the decision of a person of ordinary prudence and comprehension.").
13 Mark Zingale, Note, Fashioning a Victim Standard in Mail and Wire Fraud: Ordinarily
Prudent Person or Monumentally Credulous Gull?, 99 COLuM. L. REV. 795, 817 (1999).
14 PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS DRAFTING COMM., PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT § 4.18.1341 (Judge D. Brock
Hornby's 201o Revisions) [hereinafter FIRST CIRCUIT, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
REVISED] ("A 'material' fact or matter is one that has a natural tendency to influence or be
capable of influencing the decision of the decisionmaker to whom it was addressed.").
15 Zingale, supra note 13, at 795-
16 Seeid. at 822-23.
17 See id. at 822.
18 Seeid.at82o.
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of the Internet and email, called phishing.
This Note concludes that the objective definition of materiality that
requires any frauds perpetrated to be capable of deceiving a "person
of ordinary prudence" is improper and affirmatively advocates for the
subjective view. The objective interpretation insulates the creators of
fraudulent schemes from prosecution and is inconsistent with both the text
of the mail and wire fraud statutes and the interpretation of those statutes
by the United States Supreme Court. This Note argues that in this digital
age, when our email inboxes are inundated with phishing attempts on a
daily basis, the focus of the mail and wire fraud statutes should be on the
person perpetrating the scheme to defraud so that even the gullible among
us can be vindicated when they become the victims of fraud.
I. FRAUD: A LOOK AT THE CONFUSION BEHIND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
In 1999, the Supreme Court, in Neder v. United States, held that
materiality was an element of mail and wire fraud statutes.'9 That decision
has led to inconsistent treatment of the materiality requirement in the U.S.
court system.z0 This inter-circuit non-uniformity merits attention because
materiality is an element of two of the most widely used criminal statutes in
the federal system, and the confusion is occurring at a time when attempts
at mail and wire fraud are becoming increasingly prevalent with the
widespread use of the Internet and email." To understand the confusion
behind the materiality standard, it is helpful to review the historical
antecedents to the mail and wire fraud statutes and their rationales.
A. Common-Law Forerunners to the Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes
Before the mail and wire fraud statutes were enacted, Congress had
addressed the problem of historical get-rich-quick schemes with the
common law crime of cheat." This crime involved the use of a falsity "to
defraud another into parting with his money or property."" Cheat used
an objective standard and required that the fraud be of such a nature that
19 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999).
20 See infra Part II.
21 See Internet Users, THE WORLD BANK, http://datafinder.worldbank.org/internet-users
(showing that in 2oo8, seventy-six out of every one hundred Americans were classified as
Internet users).
22 See United States v. Svete, 556 F.3d 1157, I162 (1 ith Cir. 2oo9) (en banc) (citing 2
FRANcis WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 2056, 2128
(7th ed., Philadelphia, Kay & Brother 1874)).
23 3 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON's CRIMINAL LAW § 4 09 (15th ed. 1995) (citations omit-
ted).
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"common prudence could not guard against it."2 4
Dissatisfaction ensued regarding the use of the objective standard
under the cheat laws, however." The use of an objective standard was the
impetus behind the creation of the false pretenses statute, which was the
next chronological precursor to our modern fraud statutes. 6 Under the false
pretenses statute, it was commonly held that it did not matter "how patent
the falsity of a pretence may be."z7 Whether the act succeeded in defrauding
was all that mattered to be guilty of the crime." It was clear during the
1870s and 1880s that the false pretenses statute equally "protected both
the gullible and the savvy."2 9 A leading treatise at the time emphasized
this position, stating that some older cases held that the pretense must be
"calculated to mislead men of ordinary prudence," "[b]ut, in reason, and it is
believed according to the better modern authorities, a pretence calculated
to mislead a weak mind, if practised on such a mind, is just as obnoxious
to the law as one calculated to overcome a strong mind . . . ."Io When the
false pretenses statute was created, its sponsor explained its purpose as
preventing "the frauds which are mostly gotten up in the large cities ...
by thieves, forgers, and rapscallions generally, for the purpose of deceiving
and fleecing the innocent people in the country."' These statements make
clear that the crime of false pretenses did not have a reasonable victim
requirement." It is equally clear that the tide and attitude toward the law
was shifting toward protecting the gullible and weak-minded to the same
degree as the ordinarily prudent man.
B. The Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes under Neder v. United States
When the mail fraud statute was enacted and subsequently interpreted
in Neder, the Court rationalized that in the absence of instruction to the
contrary, it would interpret the statute based on the well-settled meaning
24 Id. (citations omitted).
25 See, e.g., Svete, 556 F.3d at 1162-63.
26 Id.at I162.
27 Id. at 1163 (quoting WHARTON, supra note 22, § 2128) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
28 WHARTON,supra note 22, § 2128.
29 Svete, 556 F3d at 1163 (citing Wharton, supra note 22, § 2128-2132b; 2 JOEL PRENTISS
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 433 (6th ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co.
1877)).
3o BISHOP, supra note 29, § 433.
31 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987) (alteration in original) (quoting
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870) (remarks of Representative Farnsworth during
debate in previous Congress)).
32 See State v. Phelps, 84 P. 24, 26 (Wash. 1906); see also State v. Keyes, 93 S.W. 801, 807
(Mo. 1906) (stating that the rule that there is no fraud where a victim could easily investigate
is "opposed by the overwhelming weight of authorities in this country").
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of the term "fraud" at the time of the statute's enactment.3 The Supreme
Court considered false pretenses (the statutory precursor to the mail and
wire fraud statutes) to embody the elements of fraud that the common law
had defined it to include.' As a result, the Court held that mail and wire
fraud statutes, without contrary indication, embodied the crime of false
pretenses, including its materiality requirement and its lack of a reasonable
victim standard." The government argued against this position and cited
Dur/andv. United States, 6 asserting that the mail fraud statute was broader
than the common law crime of false pretenses. The Court rejected the
government's argument and distinguished Dur/and, stating that "[a]lthough
Durland held that the mail fraud statute reaches conduct that would not
have constituted 'false pretenses' at common law, it did not hold, as the
Government argues, that the statute encompasses more than common-law
fraud."" The Supreme Court then explained, however, "that the [mail and
wire] fraud statutes did not incorporate all the elements of common law
fraud."" The Court acknowledged that the "common law requirements of
'justifiable reliance' and 'damages,' for example, . .. ha[d] no place in the
federal statutes.... By prohibiting the 'scheme to defraud' rather than the
completed fraud," those elements would be inconsistent with the statute's
operation."
While these distinctions create a very fine line, it is clear that the
Supreme Court interpreted the mail fraud statute to include the common
understanding of fraud and false pretenses, except to the extent those
elements are incompatible with the statute itself. The Neder court held that
materiality was an element of the federal mail and wire fraud statutes.4 The
Court adopted a definition of materiality in the text of the opinion, stating,
"[iun general, a false statement is material if it has a natural tendency to
influence, or [is] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking
body to which it was addressed."4 Every source cited by the Supreme Court
in Neder "support[s] the proposition that materiality may be proved without
establishing that the misrepresentation was objectively reliable." 43
As a result, after Neder, it seems clear that the objective standard is
not a part of the mail and wire fraud statutes. Essentially, the Court made
33 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1999).
34 Id. at 23 & n.6.
35 Id. at 24-25.
36 Duriand v. United States, 161 U.S. 3o6 (1896).
37 Neder, 527 U.S. at 24.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 24-25 (citations omitted).
41 Id. at 25.
42 Id. at 16 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotations marks omitted).
43 United States v. Svete, 556 F3d I157, 1164 (1 ith Cir. 2009) (en banc).
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clear that the concept of justifiable reliance (or the objective standard) was
inconsistent with the impetus behind the mail and wire fraud statutes,
which was to punish the scheme to defraud rather than the completed
fraud. By establishing that the focus of the mail and wire fraud statutes is
properly on the scheme, which is fashioned before a victim is chosen, it is
evident that the victim need not be taken into account when prosecuting
crimes under these statutes. Rather, in consideration of the catalysts and
rationale behind the development of the crime of fraud, the plain text of
the fraud statutes, along with the incorporation of the well-settled meaning
of fraud from its statutory precursors and the definition of materiality
adopted by the Supreme Court in Neder, it seems abundantly clear that the
fraud statutes adopt a subjective standard. So, the question is, why all the
confusion?
C. Post-Neder Confusion
The confusion that has ensued since Nedercan be attributed to a footnote
in the opinion that has led to a conflation of the concepts of civil fraud and
criminal fraud. In footnote number five, the Court cites the definition of
materiality from the Restatement (Second) of Torts," which labels a matter
material if:
(a) a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence
in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question; or
(b) the maker of the representation knows or has reason to know that its
recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as important in determining
his choice of action, although a reasonable man would not so regard it.
The language from this Restatementcontains the "reasonable man" objective
standard."
This language, however, comes from a sentence in the opinion that
begins with "Neder contends." 47 It is entirely possible that this standard
was merely what Neder was arguing for at the time, rather than the Court's
endorsement of the "reasonable man" objective standard. At any rate, the
objective standard is clearly the standard for civil actions and cannot be
taken at face value in a criminal case, especially an action in fraud. In fact, a
closer look at the Restatement language and comments clearly explains that a
victim of fraud need not "exercise the care of a reasonable man for his own
protection."" In another comment, the Restatement provides that "[o]ne who
practices upon another's known idiosyncrasies cannot complain if he is held
44 Neder, 527 U.S. at 22 n.5.
45 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1977).
46 Id.
47 Neder, 527 U.S. at 22.
48 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 545A cmt. a (1977); see also id. § 540.
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liable when he is successful in what he is endeavoring to accomplish." 49The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed this
argument and reasoned that "whatever role, if any, a victim's negligence
plays as a bar to civil recovery, it makes little sense as a defense under a
criminal statute that embraces 'any scheme or artifice to defraud."'s0
A commentator notes that many of the leading mail and wire fraud
cases upholding the "ordinarily prudent person" standard tend to "conflate
criminal and civil fraud," but argues that they differ.s" Civil fraud involves
"lower evidentiary standards, . . . two or more private parties," and more
significantly, actual injury and damages to the victim.s2 As a result, the
objective standard in civil cases makes much more sense because the victim
is the impetus behind the complaint, and the objective standard serves as
protection against "opportunistic lawsuits" filed by members of the public
at large who might need more of a check than the government (who would
file the criminal fraud action)." The objective standard makes less sense in
a criminal case filed by the government who is not in need of that control. It
seems likely, and is supported by the applicable case law, that the confusion
after Neder is the product of an improper conflation of the civil materiality
and fraud standards into the criminal law.
Based on the text, history, and current interpretations of the mail and
wire fraud statutes, it is both the intent of Congress and the interpretation of
the Supreme Court that the objective standard for materiality has no place
in the federal statutory scheme for fraud crimes. Despite these precedents,
however, some courts of appeals hold that both mail and wire fraud require
proof of a scheme to defraud that is objectively reliable,
II. FooLs: THE VICTIM STANDARDS THAT EVOLVED
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The two victim standards that evolved in federal courts after the
Neder opinion are the objective and subjective standards." The subjective
standard does not take into account the "gullibility" of the victim and
49 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 cmt. f (1977).
50 United States v. Svete, 556 E3d 1157, 1165 (2009) (en banc) (first emphasis added)
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006)).
51 Zingale,supra note 13, at 817.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 817-18.
54 SIXTH CIRcuIT, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12 ("A misrepre-
sentation or concealment is 'material' if it has a natural tendency to influence or is capable of
influencing the decision of a person of ordinary prudence and comprehension."). It is notable
that the commentary to the pattern instruction indicates some degree of uncertainty on this
point. Id. at committee cmt., at 271-72.
55 See Svete, 556 F3d at I 166-67.
386 [Vol. 99
FRAUD, FOOLS, AND PHISHING
focuses exclusively on the perpetrator of the fraud. 6 This standard allows
federal prosecutors to prosecute the crime of mail fraud when any scheme
to defraud has been created without focusing on whether it victimized (or
would have victimized) a person of ordinary prudence. The alternative is
the objective standard, which would require the scheme to be capable of
deceiving (or have deceived) a hypothetical "person of ordinary prudence
or comprehension."" The objective standard creates a higher bar for
federal prosecutors, preventing them from prosecuting the perpetrators of
fraud who were fortunate enough to deceive a person of below average
intelligence or any type of person who might not fall into the objective
ordinary prudent person category. Both standards are frequently used in
the federal court system.s8
A. The Subjective Standard
The First, Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits
use the subjective standard of materiality when assessing mail and wire
fraud prosecutions. In support of the subjective standard, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit drew a distinction between civil and criminal
fraud, finding the following:
If a scheme to defraud has been or is intended to be devised, it makes no
difference whether the persons the schemers intended to defraud are gullible
or skeptical, dull or bright. These are criminal statutes, not tort concepts.
The only issue is whether there is a plan, scheme or artifice intended to
defraud. We discern no intention on the part of Congress to differentiate
between schemes that will ensnare the ordinary prudent investor and those
that attract only those with lesser mental acuity.59
The subjective approach is also reflected in the pattern jury instructions
for the First Circuit, which defines a material fact as "one that has a natural
tendency to influence or be capable of influencing the decision of the
decisionmaker to whom it was addressed.""The mail fraud jury instruction
allows any perpetrator of a fraudulent scheme to be prosecuted without the
limiting focus on the nature of the victim present in the objective approach.
It properly places the focus on the fraudulent scheme itself, rather than the
completed fraud.
56 Zingale, supra note 13, at 812.
57 Id. at 817.
58 See infra Part II.A-B.
59 United States v. Brien, 617 E2d 299, 31 (ist Cir. 1980).
6o FIRST CIRCUIT, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, REVISED, Supra note 14,
§ 4.18.1341 (Judge D. Brock Hornby'S 20IO Revisions) ("A'material' fact or matter is one that
has a natural tendency to influence or be capable of influencing the decision of the decision-
maker to whom it was addressed.").
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also uses a subjective
standard.61 The court in United States v. Sylvanus stated that the mail fraud
statute was "intended to protect the gullible, the ignorant and the over-
credulous as well as the more skeptical."6 In reference to the fraudulent
insurance advertisements at issue in Sylvanus, the court further explained
the lack of emphasis on the victim by stating:
It goes without saying almost that it is extremely difficult for a layman to
understand the terms and conditions of such policies as these, but whether
the applicants did or did not read and understand the policies is beside the
point.The question was whether, upon the whole record, the representations
were fraudulently made and this was a question for the jury."
The entire thrust of the inquiry was the fraudulent scheme itself, not
the ability of the layperson to understand the complicated terms of the
insurance policy.' Whether or not the victims in Sylvanus were capable
of understanding the policy, if the policy itself was fraudulent, they were
granted the protection of the mail fraud statute.
Furthermore, in United States v. Coffman, Seventh Circuit Judge Posner
wrote that it was hard for him to believe that language used by a court
applying the objective standard in a mail fraud prosecution was intended
to be "understood literally."" If it were, he reasoned, "it would invite con
men to prey on people of below-average judgment or intelligence, who are
anyway the biggest targets of such criminals," and the people who need the
protections of the laws the most.6
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit observes the subjective
standard as well. 67 In Lemon v. United States, the court stated that "[iut is
immaterial whether only the most gullible would have been deceived
by this technique. Section 1341 protects the naive as well as the worldly-
wise, and the former are more in need of protection than the latter."' The
court also suggested that "the lack of guile on the part of those [victims]
solicited" may itself be evidence of the fraudulent character of the scheme."
Reflecting this standard, the jury instructions for the Ninth Circuit explain
that statements are material if "they would reasonably influence a person
to part with money or property."70
61 United States v. Sylvanus, 192 E2d 96, 105 (7th Cir. 1951).
62 Id. (citation omitted).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 United States v. Coffman, 94 E3d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 1996).
66 Id.
67 See Lemon v. United States, 278 Fzd 369,373 (9th Cir. 196o).
68 Id. (citation omitted).
69 Id. (quoting Norman v. United States, oo Fzd 905, 907 (6th Cir. 1939)).
70 CRIMINAL COMMITTEE ON MODEL JURY INSTRucTIONs, NINTH CIRCUIT MANUAL OF
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Finally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
uses the subjective standard." In United States v. Maxwell, the appellant
argued against her wire fraud conviction, contending that "no fraudulent
scheme existed because no reasonable person would have believed her
misrepresentations."" The court disagreed:
Appellant is simply wrong, however, if she means to assert that the wire
fraud statute does not apply where the persons defrauded unreasonably
believed the misrepresentations made to them. In the words of one court,
"it makes no difference whether the persons the scheme is intended to
defraud are gullible or skeptical, dull or bright.... The only issue is whether
there is a plan, scheme or artifice intended to defraud." 3
The court endorsed a statement from United States v. Pollack" that to hold
that actual loss to a victim is required "'would lead to the illogical result
that the legality of a defendant's conduct would depend on his fortuitous
choice of a gullible victim."'"5
All of the circuits using a subjective standard embrace the logic, plain
language, and history of the mail and wire fraud statutes and place the
focus of the inquiry on the scheme to defraud rather than on the victim
who was defrauded.
B. The Objective Standard
On the other hand, the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits clearly use an
objective standard. The Fourth Circuit took the objective approach early
on. 6 In Linden v. United States, the defendants were accused of engaging
in a scheme that consisted of mailing a document that appeared to be the
telephone company's bill for renewing advertisements in the telephone
directory.7 The invoice, however, was for advertising in the defendants'
less popular publication." The publication was actually created, but
the defendants were accused of relying on the careless reading of those
to whom the invoices were mailed. 9 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the
convictions of the defendants by quoting the reasoning of the district court
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS§ 8.ioi (2003).
71 United States v. Maxwell, 920 F.2d 1028, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
72 Id.
73 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 3H (ist Cir.
1980)).
74 United States v. Pollack, 534 E2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
75 Afaxwell, 92o Fzd at 1036 (quoting Pollack, 534 F.2d at 971).
76 See Linden v. United States, 254 F.2d 560, 566 (4th Cir. 1958).
77 Id. at 562-64.
78 Id. at 562.
79 Id. at 563-64.
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that the scheme was "reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary
prudence and comprehension." 0
The U.S. Court ofAppeals for the Sixth Circuit also observes the "person
of ordinary prudence" standard.' As a result, the circuit's model jury
instruction states that "[a] misrepresentation or concealment is 'material'
if it has a natural tendency to influence or is capable of influencing the
decision of a person of ordinary prudence and comprehension."" The
Eighth Circuit also utilizes the objective standard.13
The Second, Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits purport to use an objective
standard, but recent decisions indicate that they might be moving toward a
more subjective understanding of materiality.
In 1962, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
the standard of materiality for a mail fraud conviction was the objective
"person of ordinary prudence" standard.8 The court stated that "[i]n every
mail fraud case, there must be a scheme to defraud, representations known
by defendants to be false and some person or persons must have been
defrauded."8 In later cases, however, the Second Circuit shifted its emphasis
from the victim's injury to the actions and intent of the defendant. 6
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit utilizes the objective
standard, finding that "[tihe scheme 'need not be fraudulent on its face
but must involve some sort of fraudulent misrepresentations or omissions
reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and
comprehension.""' Its model jury instruction describes a material fact as
"one which would reasonably be expected to be of concern to a reasonable
and prudent person in relying upon the representation or statement in
making a decision."" In a recent case, however, the Third Circuit stated
that "[tihe negligence of the victim in failing to discover a fraudulent
So Id. at 566 (internal quotation marks omitted).
81 United States v. Jamieson, 427 F3 d 394, 415-16 (6th Cir. 2oo5); Berent v. Kemper
Corp., 973 F.2d 1291, 1294 (6th Cit. 1992); Blount Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Walter E. Heller & Co.,
819 F2d 151, 153 (6th Cir. 1987); United States v. Van Dyke, 605 F.2d 220, 225 (6th Cir. 1979).
82 SIXTH CIRCUIT, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Supra note 12.
83 United States v. Hawkey, 148 E3d 920, 924 (8th Cit. 1998).
84 United States v. Baren, 305 F.2d 527, 533 (2d Cir. 1962).
85 Id. at 528.
86 See United States v. Regent Office Supply Co., 421 F.2d 1174, 1ISo (2d Cir.1970)
("Proof that someone was actually defrauded is unnecessary simply because the critical ele-
ment in a 'scheme to defraud' is 'fraudulent intent."' (quoting Durland v. United States, 161
U.S. 306 (1896))).
87 United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1243 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v.
Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 535 (3d Cit. 1978)).
88 Comm. ON MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITHIN THE THIRD CIRCUIT,
MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
§ 6.18.1341-1 (2oo9).
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scheme is not a defense to criminal conduct."" This perhaps indicates that
they are no longer in accord with the objective standard.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit similarly invokes
the objective standard, holding that "[in order to constitute a 'scheme
to defraud' the scheme must be shown to be reasonably calculated to
deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension."9 The model
jury instructions for the Fifth Circuit, however, define materiality as "a
natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision of
the person or entity to which it is addressed." 91 This appears to be a more
subjective standard.
Utilizing the objective standard, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held, in a Winter Olympics bid-rigging case, that "a 'scheme
to defraud is conduct intended or reasonably calculated to deceive persons
of ordinary prudence or comprehension."' 92 On the other hand, the pattern
jury instructions for the Tenth Circuit seem to reflect a more subjective
standard, providing that "[a] false statement is 'material' if it has a natural
tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision of the
person or entity to which it is addressed."9 3 In further support of a more
subjective standard, the Tenth Circuit has also stated that it "find[s] no
precedent supporting [the] position that a scheme to defraud is a violation
only if it would deceive a reasonably prudent person."'
C. Mail Fraud in the Eleventh Circuit:
Moving from Objective to Subjective
Clearly, the interpretation of the materiality definition in the federal
courts is inconsistent and in a state of upheaval. This has profound
implications for the world of federal criminal law because two of its most
commonly used statutes are not uniformly interpreted. Addressing this
confusion, a recent case from the Eleventh Circuit, United States v. Svete,
sheds light on the lack of uniformity by overruling a line of cases utilizing
the objective standard and adopting the subjective interpretation.95
In 1996, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in United
States v. Brown, held that to prove mail or wire fraud, "the government must
89 Coyle, 63 E3d at 1244 (citation omitted).
90 United States v. Netterville, 553 F.2d 903, 909 (5th Cir. 1977).
91 CoMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, DisT. JUDGES Ass'N FIFTH CIRCUIT, PATTERN
JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASEs) § 2.59 (2001).
92 United States v. Welch, 327 E3 d io81, I io6(ioth Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v.
Cochran, 109 E3d 66o, 664-65 (ioth Cir. 1997)).
93 CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION COMM. OF THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
TENTH CIRCUIT, CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.56 (zoo5).
94 United States v. Drake, 932 E2d 861, 864 (roth Cir. 1991).
95 United States v. Svete, 556 E3d 1157, 1169 (I ith Cir. 2009) (en banc).
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show the defendant intended to create a scheme reasonably calculated to
deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension." 9 6 The court also
stated, "[t]he 'person of ordinary prudence' standard is an objective standard
not directly tied to the experiences of a specific person or persons."97 In
Brown, the court reversed the mail fraud convictions of four real estate
developers because the court determined that their scheme would not have
deceived an ordinary prudent person, and their victims could have figured
out the scheme was fraudulent if they had investigated.98 Interestingly,
the Brown court relied heavily on an analysis of civil fraud precedents,
lending support to the argument that the inter-circuit confusion is owed
to the conflation of civil and criminal fraud theories." In 2009, an en banc
panel in the Eleventh Circuit reconsidered this approach and overruled
United States v. Brown, using, and advocating for, a subjective standard of
materiality.'"
The Svete defendants were agents who sold "financial interests in
viatical settlements, which are financial products based on agreements
with persons (known as viators) who have terminal illnesses and sell their
life insurance policies to third parties for less than the mature value of the
policies to benefit from the proceeds while alive."'01 As it turned out, the
statements made by the sales agents were not true.10 The information
about the viators given to the third parties was untrue, as "[t]he viators were
not terminally ill." 10 3 Svete, an agent selling the fraudulent interests, had
a medical underwriter create false opinions of life expectancy and make
them look as though physicians created them. " After the Svete defendants
were charged with mail fraud, they defended on the ground "that a person
of ordinary prudence and sophistication would have read the contracts
and ignored the false statements by the sales agents."10 The defendants
requested a jury instruction based on that argument that read as follows:
To prove a fraud crime, the government must show that the defendant under
consideration intended to devise or participate in a scheme reasonably
calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension.
The person of ordinary prudence standard is an objective standard
and is not directly related to the gullibility or level of knowledge and
96 United States v. Brown, 79 F 3 d 1550, 1557 (1 ith Cit. 1996) (citation and internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
97 Id.
98 Brown, 79 F3d at 1559.
99 Zingale, supra note 13, at 806.
1oo United States v. Svete, 556 E3d I157, 1159 (1 Ith Cir. 2009) (en banc).
io Id. at I16o.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
ios Id. at 1I161.
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experience of any specific person or persons. For purposes of this offense,
the government must prove that a reasonable person of average prudence
and comprehension would have acted on the representation made by the
defendant under consideration."
The district court rejected this instruction that embodied the objective
standard.10 Instead, it approved an instruction that stated in part, "[a] fact is
material if it has a natural tendency to influence or is capable of influencing
the decision of the person or entity to whom or which it is addressed."'"
This jury instruction clearly embodied the subjective standard. The refusal
to give the first jury instruction was upheld by the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals.'"
The Svete court reasoned that from the inception of the mail fraud
statute, congressional intent had been to create a broad application of
the rule"t0 and to prevent "'large-scale swindles, get-rich-quick schemes,
and financial frauds.""" The court stated, "Congress has never used any
language that would limit the coverage of the mail fraud statute to schemes
that would deceive only prudent persons.""' The court elaborated, "the
sponsor of the original statute explained that its purpose was 'to prevent
the frauds which are mostly gotten up in the large cities . . . by thieves,
forgers, and rapscallions generally, for the purpose of deceiving and fleecing
the innocent people in the country...11
In addition to congressional intent, the Svete court looked to prior
Supreme Court precedent, citing Durlandv. United States for the proposition
that "the object of the criminal [mail and wire fraud] prohibition[s] is the
intent of the malefactor, not the reasonableness of the victim."" 4
The court reasoned that because, as is the case with any criminal law,
the mail fraud statute focuses on the violator, the purpose of the materiality
requirement is to ensure that the scheme was actually created or devised
with the intent to defraud."' "Proof that a defendant created a scheme
to deceive reasonable people is sufficient evidence that the defendant
intended to deceive, but a defendant who intends to deceive the ignorant
or gullible by preying on their infirmities is no less guilty. Either way, the
io6 Id.
i07 Id.
io8 Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
io9 Id.at 1'70.
iio Id. at i162 (quoting Rakoff, supra note 6, at 822).
iii Id. (quoting Rakoff, supra note 6, at 780) (internal quotation marks omitted).
112 Id.at ii63.
113 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356
(1987)).
H4 Id. at 1162 (citing Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 315 (1896)).
115 Id. at 1165.
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defendant has criminal intent.""'6 The court proceeded unanimously to
declare the objective rule inconsistent with both the plain words of the
mail fraud statute and the interpretation of that statute by the US Supreme
Court in Neder and Durland."I All Eleventh Circuit judges participating in
the en banc hearing agreed that the objective standard previously used in
Brown was no longer a correct statement of the law."'
The court of appeals in Svete captured the history behind the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the mail and wire fraud statutes."' The court
agreed that the state of the law is that the objective standard of materiality
has no place in the mail and wire fraud statutes.zo The fact that the objective
standard is still in use is not a negligible concern.
The failure to disentangle the civil and criminal fraud concepts in the
circuits has potentially far-reaching impacts that grow exponentially with
the daily increases in access to technology and fraud attempts perpetrated
indiscriminately upon society. The subjective standard of materiality
provides federal prosecutors with the vehicle they need to combat new
and creative forms of fraud attempts and everyone in society with equal
protection under the mail and wire fraud laws. Phishing is a modern
example of growing fraud attempts in the U.S. and the continuing viability
and importance of the mail and wire fraud statutes. Phishing also provides
a useful tool to elucidate the impact the different victim standards have on
the prosecution of mail and wire fraud.
III. PHISHING: IMPLICATIONS OF VICTIM STANDARDS IN THE INTERNET AGE
A certain class of persons . . . send out circulars through the United
States mails which appeal to the cupidity of the ignorant and hold out to the
unfortunate the temptation to try to better their fortunes .... Farmers and
country merchants and country postmasters are constantly plied with these
circulars,... and plain as the fraud is upon its face, these men reap a golden
harvest. The city papers frequently contain notices of the ignorant victims
who venture to the cities and are relieved of their money; but there is no
notice of the many smaller dupes who send their money through the mails
in answer to these advertisements and pocket their losses .... This bill ...
will, if properly enforced, put an end to this infamous business.'
This language is from a Senate report in the year 1889 when the mail
fraud statute was amended and rings of familiarity in the modern age. Moving
to more recent history, financial frauds and get-rich-quick schemes in the
II6 Id.
117 Id. at iI66.
II8 Id. at ii6o.
i19 Id. at 1162-63.
120 Id.at I163.
121 Id. at 1163 (alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. No. 50-2566, at 2 (1889)).
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1960s were described as making it "apparent that rudimentary criminal
codes, conceived for rural societies and confined by states lines and local
considerations, could not cope with those who saw manifold opportunities
for gain in the new activities.""zz Whatever new activities were available
to defraud unwitting victims in the 1960s, it is unlikely that they were as
prevalent, constant, and manipulative as these attempts are today. While
the foundational crime of fraud has not changed a great deal in the last 100
years, the technology used to carry it out has. The Internet has become a
medium for the perpetrators of fraud to hone their craft. From solicitations
to schemes to work-from-home advertisements and lottery and beneficiary
notifications, Americans are constantly plied with the temptations to trade
their property or information for something infinitely greater.
One need only take a look at his or her email inbox to confirm that this
is true. Most financial frauds perpetrated through the Internet and emails
today are called "phishing." The term originated from the idea of actual
fishing, because not unlike the sport, the scam involves both a theoretical
"hook" and "catch.""' Phishing is defined as "a scam by which an e-mail
user is duped into revealing personal or confidential information which the
scammer can use illicitly."' 24 Phishing scams of this nature are becoming
more common and costly."' Recently, in Operation Phish Phry, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation found that a single online scam attempt netted
phishers more than two million dollars from online victims through email
in less than two years.12 6 A commentator has estimated that "US companies
lose more than [two billion dollars] annually as their clients fall victim"
to phishing attempts.'27 It follows that federal prosecutors must remain
capable of prosecuting fraud crimes in order to vindicate this vital federal
interest. As a result of the prevalence of fraud in our modern electronic
world, it would be challenging to find any email inbox without at least one
phishing attempt.
i22 Abraham S. Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405,420-21
(1959)-
123 Mary Landesman, Scammers Target Unemployed, Asourcom, http://antivirus.about.
com/od/emailscams/a/jobscams.htm (last visited Sept. 3, zoo).
124 Phishing, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
phishing (last visited Sept. 3, 2010).
125 Paul L. Kerstein, How Can We Stop Phishing and Pharming Scams?, CSO SECURITY
AND RisK (July I9, 2005), www.esoonline.com/article/print/220491.
126 Brad Stone, FBI. Indicts Dozens in Online Bank Fraud, N.Y. TINiES, Oct. 8, 2009, at
B3.
127 Kerstein,supra note 125.
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Here are two examples that might look familiar:
(1) Hello,
My name is Mrs. Sheila Johnson. I am a dying woman who had decided
to donate what I have to you. I am 59 years old and was diagnosed for cancer
about 2 years ago, immediately after the death of my husband, who had
left me everything he worked for. I have been touched by God to donate
from what I have inherited from my late husband to you for the good work
of God, rather than allowing my relatives to use my husband's hard earned
funds ungodly.
... I have decided to WILL/donate the sum of $10,500,000.00. (Ten million
five hundred thousand dollars) to you for the good work of the lord, and
to help the motherless, less privileged and also for the assistance of the
widows.
KindlyContactmy lawyerthrough thisemail address (advocaatvancurtis@
aol.nl) or you can call his private Lin: Tel:+31-647-285-270. If you are
interested in carrying out this task, so that he can arrange the release of the
funds ($10,500,000.00) to you. My lawyer's name is Advocate Curtis Van. I
know I have never met you but my mind tells me to do this, and I hope you
act sincerely.
NB: I will appreciate your utmost confidentiality in this matter until the
task is complished, As I don't want anything that will Jeopardize my last
wish, due to the fact that I do not want relatives or family members standing
in the way of my last wish.
Thank you and God bless you. Mrs. Sheila Johnson"z"
(2) Contact Person: Mr. PHILIP EZE
CITI BANK OF NIGERIA
Phone number: +2348050777232
EMAIL: ( mr.philiezee@sify.com)
Tell Mr. PHILIP EZE that you received a message from the OFFICE
OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE to send you the ATM CARD and
PIN NUMBER AND ALL THE DOCUMENT which you will use to
withdraw your USD$10 Million Dollars, also send him your direct phone
number and contact address where you want him to send the ATM CARD
and PIN NUMBER to you BUT YOU WILL PAY FOR THE LITTLE
INSURANCE AND SHIPMENT FEES FOR DELIVERY.
All the document regards to the release of the fund has been handed
over to Mr. PHILIP EZE for delivery.
128 E-mail from Mrs. Sheila Johnson to Sarah N. Welling, Professor of Law, University of
Kentucky College of Law (Oct. 25, 2009, 18:07 EST) (on file with author).
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We are very sorry for the delay you have gone through in the past
years. Thanks for adhering to this instruction and once again accept my
congratulations.
Best Regards.
MRS. HILLARY CLINTON
SECRETARY OF STATE' 2 9
While these emails are hilarious to some, they no doubt create situations
where people, through inadvertence, oversight, lack of attention, or some
mental infirmity fall prey to these types of scams.
Suppose an elderly lady with cancer and suffering from the early stages
of dementia receives the email above from Shelia Johnson. It is very
unlikely that a reasonable or ordinary prudent person would take this email
seriously. The lady just described, however, may be the perfect target for
this type of online scam. If she feels sympathy for Johnson, contacts her,
and gives up her bank account numbers or money, federal prosecutors may
not be able to win a case against the perpetrators of the fraud because the
victim was likely not acting as an ordinary prudent person.
Under the application of the objective standard used in Brown,'30 there
is a strong argument that through some further investigation, our theoretical
victim could have discovered that this email was fraudulent. This argument
won the day in the Eleventh Circuit prior to the Svete opinion, leaving our
victim without any system of recourse, even though a fraudulent scheme
was certainly perpetrated upon her. In addition to the intrinsic injustice of
the victim standard, this illustration starkly shows that with low-level fraud
attempts such as these emails, those who will be denied the protection of
the federal fraud statutes are exactly those who need their protection the
most. It is unlikely that most people would do anything more than send
these messages to their junk folder, and most people would never fall for
a fraud attempt such as either of these. These "ordinary prudent" people
seem to be the only ones the objective standard protects, and they don't
need its protection. Those who would never be deceived by these types
of emails do not need to be protected from them. This is the unfortunate,
counterintuitive result of the objective standard at work in the Internet
age.
Interestingly, it follows from this hypothetical that the less believable
the fraud attempt is, and the less likely it is to deceive an ordinary
prudent person, the more insulation the perpetrators of the fraud have
from prosecution under the objective standard. The more insulation from
criminal charges the perpetrators of the fraud have, the more motivation
129 E-mail from Mrs. Hillary Clinton to Sarah N. Welling, Professor of Law, University of
Kentucky College of Law (Oct. 23, 2009, 17:o1 EST) (on file with author).
130 United States v. Brown, 79 F.3 d 1550, 1557 (I ith Cir. 1996).
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they are given to continue to send out these types of emails and commit
fraud. In this way, the objective standard actually encourages and perpetuates
lower-level fraud attempts. Fraudsters could be catalyzed by the thought
that if no ordinary prudent person would fall for their scheme, then they
will only ensnare the gullible or feeble-minded, therefore they cannot be
prosecuted under the objective standard. In the way of incentives, the
objective standard in this scenario does not create an acceptable one.
In addition to happening upon especially desirable scamming targets,
by throwing a wide net, these perpetrators often target those who are
specifically "down on their luck" or unemployed."' Three email scams
commonly used to target the unemployed are: (1) "reshipping fraud,"
(2) "payment processing," and (3) "free money scams.""' The "hook" in
reshipping fraud consists of asking someone "to receive shipments to be
repackaged and forwarded to another address, usually overseas.""' The
"catch" is that the person will then be "asked to declare the shipments
as gifts on Customs forms-a criminal offense."'" "Typically, the items
have been . . . purchased with stolen credit cards, making [the victim]
an accomplice to other crimes.""' The "hook" in payment processing
scams is being "asked to receive wire transfer payments into your bank
account, subtract a commission . . . , then wire the remainder to another
account . . 1 136 These scams are usually steps in broad money laundering
schemes." A person is "caught" when he or she wires the funds out of his
or her account, and a stop is put on the original transfer, forcing the victim
to cover the amount of money he or she wired out.3 8 "Free money scams"
are very familiar and usually look something like the following:
CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA
TINUBU SQUARE VICTORIA
ISLAND LAGOS NIGERIA
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
Hello Dear
I am the newly appointed Deputy governor of Central Bank of
Nigeria,My name is Dr. Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu. On assumption
of office on the 13th of October 2009 I discovered that you are
being owed the sum of TEN MILLION, SEVEN HUNDRED
131 Landesman, supra note 123.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
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THOUSAND UNITED STATES DOLLRS as unpaid contract/
inherittance/lottery fund in Contractors Category [A] Record file.
I am specially appointed to fight against scammers and to make
sure that everyone being owed by my government is being paid
immediately.
Therefore you are required to re-confirm your information for
verification and immediate payment within 24 hours.
Your Full Name:
Your Complete Address
Name of City of Residence:
Country:
Direct Telephone Number:
Mobile Number:
AGE:
Fax Number:
Occupation:
Copy of your identification
Your Nearest Airport
We shall not entertain impostors and you must proof that you are
the rightful owner of this funds before final payment commences.
Finally, you have the right to make choice between these three
mode of payments.
A)WIRE TRANSFER(BANK TO BANK)
B)DIPLOMATIC CASH PAYMENT
C)ATM CARD PAYMENT
Get back to me asap.
Yours in Service,
Dr Kingsley C. Moghalu
Deputy Governor'39
The "hook" in these types of scams is clearly the lure of free money
being given to a person due to some unknown and unexpected good
fortune coming his or her way in the form of a lottery invitation or free bank
card.14 oThe "catch" is that after contacting those perpetrating the fraud, the
person will be asked to send money to cover expenses.' 4' The victim will
be "caught" for the sham fees; in addition, any checks the victim receives
and deposits will eventually be cancelled by the bank, leaving the victim
139 E-mail from Dr. Kingsley C. Moghalu to Sarah N. Welling, Professor of Law,
University of Kentucky College of Law (Nov. 23, 2009, 22:29 EST) (on file with author).
140 Landesman, supra note 123.
141 Id.
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responsible for any portion he or she has already spent. 142
In fraud scams that specifically target those who are down on their luck,
unemployed, and desperate for money, are the scammers insulated from
prosecution because the person they are targeting is more susceptible to
a fraudulent scheme than the ordinary prudent person would be? The
perpetrators of the schemes could certainly offer this defense and, although
intuitively untenable, it would be a valid legal argument under the current
law of materiality in some jurisdictions.
The Internet is a medium through which mail and wire fraud are being
committed on a large scale in the United States. With the increasing use of
the Internet and email and the viability of this technology in society, it is
unlikely that there is a natural end to these schemes in sight. The victim
standard used in each circuit has a far-reaching impact on whether and to
what extent federal prosecutors can use the mail and wire fraud statutes as a
vehicle to fight these crimes. If they are to be given the ability to prosecute
would-be fraudsters in the spirit of mail and wire fraud regulation and
according to the plain statutory language, federal courts should follow the
example of the Eleventh Circuit in Svete and use the subjective standard so
that the rights of all victims of fraud can be vindicated equally.
CONCLUSION
In order to allow federal prosecutors the discretion required to prosecute
the increasingly common instances of online phishing, which is the modern
day cognate to historical mail fraud, it is important that federal courts adopt
the subjective standard of materiality to evaluate mail and wire fraud
convictions. This will ensure that the next innocent gull that gives money
or property to a "Nigerian prince" can be vindicated to the same extent as
her more prudent neighbor. This interpretation of the law appears to be
most consistent with the interpretation of the mail and wire fraud statutes
in the Supreme Court, and it is in line with the modern trend in federal
courts. Perhaps most importantly, the subjective approach offers consistent,
uniform protection of all Americans by preventing everyone, from the very
prudent person to the most gullible, from being "caught" and "hooked' by
a phisherman.
142 Id.
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